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Conclusions INTRODUCTION There has been a rapid growth in the number of regional trade agreements (RTAs) in recent years. In Europe, these are mainly centred on the European Union, spreading to the Central and Eastern European countries, the Baltic States, the Mediterranean and beyond. In the Americas, two agreements -NAFTA and MERCOSUR -have had a significant impact, but these may be overtaken by the Free Trade Area for the Americas.
There has also been an increase in the extent to which RTAs overlap, although there are significant variations in the product coverage and the rules of origin. On the whole, the newer agreements tend to have deeper coverage, extending into areas of domestic disciplines beyond the exchange of tariff concessions, and a number of agreements now also cover the services sector. The spread of RTAs and their coverage are discussed in Sections II and III. Bhagwati (1992) , in particular, has raised the question as to whether RTAs pose a threat to the multilateral trading system, and he has initiated a rapid growth in the economic literature on the subject. In Section IV we look briefly at some of the main arguments, and the extent to which they square up with the phenomena which we have observed.
The paper does not revisit the question of the benefits of RTAs or the conditions under which they contribute to economic welfare. However, it is worth noting that political and security considerations have been of considerable importance in the decision to form a number of RTAs, especially in Europe, and these would have been established even if strict economic criteria were not met.
In Section V we review the debate on "systemic" issues within the WTO. There are considerable differences between WTO Members' views on the meaning of certain terms in the various WTO rules relating to RTAs; such differences do not fall cleanly between those Members who participate in RTAs and the few who do not. These divergences of view have made it difficult to conclude the examination of RTAs for consistency with WTO rules, although these are not the only problem. There are proposals to clarify the rules in the new multilateral negotiations, and these are also examined briefly.
2 Finally, we conclude by posing a number of questions about the consistency of regionalism with the longer term goal of freer trade among WTO Members.
II THE SPREAD OF RTAS
The number of RTAs in force has varied considerably over the years. WTO (1999a) provides various statistics about agreements which have been notified to the GATT or the WTO, agreements which have not (yet) been notified, and those which remain in force.
According to the WTO Secretariat, 102 of the agreements which have been notified to the GATT/WTO were in force at the end of 1998. This includes 78 agreements covering trade in goods notified under Article XXIV of the GATT 1994, 13 goods agreements concluded between developing countries notified under the Enabling Clause, and 11 agreements covering trade in services notified under the GATS. More than half of these agreements have entered into force since 1990, when there were only about 40 agreements in force. In other words there were some 250 per cent more agreements in force in 1998 than eight years earlier, and we know that new agreements continue to be signed.
The longer term growth in the number of RTAs in recent years is shown in Chart 1 which shows the cumulation of RTAs notified to the WTO Secretariat, as well as the net increase. It demonstrates the rapid growth which has taken place in the 1990s. It should be noted that these figures show only notified agreements and do not include the many non-notified agreements that are in existence today. Such agreements occur when there is a time lag before official notification is made to the WTO, or when RTA participants simply fail to notify agreements. There is no provision for counter-notification of agreements under current WTO rules.
Apart from the growth in the number of agreements, modern RTAs have a much wider network of participants and stretch across countries at different levels of economic development. APEC, which does not (yet) allow for the mutual exchange of trade preferences, will cover some 40 per cent of the world's population. On the whole, the wider scope of the new agreements makes sense for participants, allowing for greater efficiency gains than is possible from the elimination of frontier barriers alone. As an illustration, the elimination or harmonization of technical barriers is the key to achieving economies of scale as well as helping regional industries to become more competitive internationally. This was considered by Ceccini (1988) 
IV REGIONALISM VERSUS MULTILATERALISM
The trend in the growth of RTAs is difficult to interpret. On the one hand, this scale of trading within regional agreements would have been difficult to imagine by the founders of the GATT. On the other hand, the trend has to be set in the context of two other recent phenomena. First, the 1990s were also a period of rapid growth of accessions to respects designed deliberately to achieve trade diversion. 3 Nevertheless, the fact is that trade within RTAs has been generally growing much faster than trade from non-members.
An analysis of seven regional integration agreements (APEC, the European Union, NAFTA, ASEAN, CEFTA, MERCOSUR and the Andean Community) shows that, on average, imports from other members of these arrangements increased on (importweighted) average at some 7 per cent a year in the period 1990-98, while imports from non-members increased at 5.5 per cent (Table 1) . 4 However, while the growth in imports from non-members was on average lower than from members (the exception is the EU whose imports from non-members grew at the same rate as from members), this is similar to the average rate of growth of 6 per cent in world imports, including those by the selected integration arrangements, in the same period. Also, it has to be noted that in the cases of NAFTA, MERCOSUR and the Andean Community imports from non-members grew at 7, 15 and 12 per cent, respectively, somewhat above the growth rate for world imports.
It is, therefore, important to look carefully at the dynamics of particular agreements. On a simple comparative static analysis, third parties may be adversely affected by trade diversion and a reduction in their terms of trade, but this is less obvious on the basis of a crude dynamic analysis, especially in the case of the faster growing RTAs. In any event, the overall numbers do not point to serious diversion away from imports from nonmembers of RTAs. On the other hand, there have certainly been concerns expressed in the Caribbean about the negative effects of NAFTA on their trade. Yeats (1997) claims evidence of trade diversion in MERCOSUR. While protection of certain sectors such as automobiles certainly limits market opportunities in MERCOSUR, overall these countries are now much more open than they were in the 1980s, and, as noted earlier, imports from third countries have also been growing rapidly (Laird, 1998) .
3 See, for example, de Melo and Dhar (1992) or Langhammer and Hiemenz (1991) . 7 Bhagwati (1992) and Krueger (1995) express strong concerns about the negative effects of growing regionalism and they worry that RTAs divert attention from the multilateral trading system. Bhagwati, in particular, stresses the benefits of free trade and rejects arguments about the need for an alternative to the GATT for countries which wish to liberalize faster, regionalism as a supplement to GATT, regionalism to accelerate the GATT processes, balance-of-payments pressures for a quick result on trade, recent experiences in Europe and the Americas, changed attitudes to liberalization in developing countries, and so on.
On the other hand, Baldwin (1997) , Ethier (1998) and Lawrence (1999) tend to regard regionalism much more as a complement to multilateralism (building blocks rather than stumbling blocks). Baldwin argues that NAFTA triggered off pressures for such agreements as a kind of domino effect. He and Lawrence both argue that such liberalization strengthens the hand of exporters and pro-trade forces. Ethier (1998) emphasises that "the new regionalism is in good part a direct result of the success of multilateral liberalization, as well as being the means by which new countries trying to enter the multilateral system (and small countries already in it) compete among themselves for direct investment".
Lawrence also makes an important point that the correct comparison is not between a preferential arrangement and complete multilateral liberalization, but between two second-best situations of multilateral liberalization that is only partial with preferential trade liberalization which could be much more complete.
Alan Winters has argued that RTAs are like street gangs: "you may not like them, but if they are in your neighbourhood, it is safer to be in one". 5 However, in Winters (1996) he argues that, on the basis of various models, it is not yet possible to determine whether regionalism encourages or discourages evolution towards globally freer trade, and in Winters (1998) , he says that there is no reason to expect a single, simple answer.
However, he is worried that regionalism probably increases the risks of catastrophe in the 8 trading system, a comment that might seem particularly apt in the wake of the Seattle WTO Ministerial meeting of late 1999.
In a look at the issue of the tendency towards large blocs of RTAs, Winters (1998) also discusses whether reducing the number of players in multilateral negotiations could simplify the process of reaching agreement at the multilateral level. Citing the difficulties that the European Union had in formulating a common position in the Uruguay Round, he argues that such powerful coalitions could make negotiations more difficult.
V RTAS IN THE WTO
Within the GATT and the WTO, the examination of specific RTAs has been plagued by disagreement about the interpretation of certain elements of the rules relating to RTAs as well as by certain procedural aspects. For example, in the 46 years of the GATT up to the end of 1994, a total of 98 agreements had been notified under Article XXIV, most of which were examined in individual working parties. But, consensus on the conformity of these agreements with GATT provisions was reached in only one case: the Czech-Slovak customs union.
On the procedural side, in an effort to streamline the examination process, the General Table 2 ).
On substantive issues, there was an attempt to clarify the rules through the WTO Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXIV of the GATT 1994, adopted as part of the Final Act of the Uruguay Round. However, the Understanding has not resolved the more difficult issues, and it was hoped that further clarification would come from the CRTA which also has in its mandate the responsibility "to consider the systemic implications of such agreements and regional initiatives for the multilateral trading system and the relationship between them, and make appropriate recommendations to the General Council".
In practice, the CRTA has not been able to resolve many of the "systemic" issues, and it is too early yet to say what might be the outcome of a proposal to clarify these issues in the context of new multilateral negotiations.
As noted in the last two annual reports of the CRTA, work on systemic issues has been based in part on issues arising in the examination of specific agreements as well as on 7 However, there is disagreement on where these issues should be discussed, with some WTO Members taking the view that some of these issues should only be considered in the Council for Trade in Services while others feel that they should be considered in CRTA. A closely related issue is the meaning of the phrase "the general incidence of duties and other regulations of commerce", which are not on the whole to be higher or more restrictive against third parties upon the formation of a customs union (Article XXIV:5).
This issue has been largely clarified with the 1994 Understanding which specifies that the evaluation of the general incidence of the duties and other regulations of commerce applicable before and after the formation of the customs union shall be based upon an overall assessment of weighted average tariff rates. (The Understanding says the weighted average tariff rates and customs duties collected, but the duties cannot be known in advance and notifications are required prior to the formation of the customs union, so the reference to customs duties collected is effectively redundant). For the purpose of this calculation, the applied rates not the bound rates are to be used. The WTO Secretariat, not the parties to the customs union, is to make the calculations according to the methodology used in the Uruguay Round. However, one issue, not 12 mentioned in the checklists is how to reconcile the import-weighted average of duties with the Uruguay Round methodology of computing arithmetic average for commitments in the agricultural sector.
If it were desired to ensure that even static trade diversion were avoided, this could be achieved by requiring that the MFN rates also be reduced to a level which would prevent or minimize trade diversion, as has been suggested by Australia in the preparatory process for Seattle. This would require a modification of the above rules -for which the prospects are not bright -and has some technical complications. Less technically complex is Bhagwhati's (1992) It has been argued, notably by Krueger (1995) that rules of origin can constitute significant non-barriers to trade, and similar arguments have been used in the CRTA where it has been argued that "rules of origin ... were relevant to the 'other regulations of commerce'-test, found in Article XXIV:5. The core of the concern [has been] that in some sectors ... the effect seemed to be to manage trade and to prevent the full tradecreating benefits of the liberalization process from developing"( WT/REG4/M/2, para.
3.). However, there are no explicit WTO disciplines on the use of preferential rules of origin. Although these are specific to free trade areas, and not to customs unions, in fact all RTAs other than the EU are customs unions in the making and work operationally 14 more like FTAs during their long, apparently interminable, gestation periods. The absence of clearcut rules on preferential ROOs is a serious shortcoming.
One proposal is that preferential rules of origin be tied to the definition of "substantially all the trade" (SAT). Thus, in measuring SAT as percentage, the base (100 per cent of trade between the RTA parties) should comprise all intra-RTA trade measured according to MFN rules, while the qualifying proportion of trade (to meet the SAT requirement)
should be measured according to preferential rules of origin. Thus, the less stringent the preferential rules of origin, the higher percentage of members' intra-trade would be included towards meeting the SAT threshold. 12
As mentioned earlier, the meaning of certain aspects of Article V of the GATS has also been raised within the systemic debate, particularly in 1999. The basic provision is that an "economic integration agreement", the term used in the GATS for an RTA covering 15 Some of the other more significant questions, drawn from the extensive Annotated Checklist, include:
• Is Article XXIV:4, stating that the purpose of an RTA "should be to facilitate trade" among the parties and "not to raise barriers to the trade" of third parties, a general statement of principle or an additional condition to be satisfied? 13
• What is the implication if an FTA member raises MFN rates within bound levels?
• What is the scope and nature of compensation to third parties for any injury caused by the creation of RTAs?
• How are certain internal differences in the WTO regulatory framework to be reconciled? For example, safeguards are normally to be applied on an MFN basis.
Given that the list of exceptions cited in Article XXIV:8 does not include safeguards or anti-dumping measures, the question arises of whether this list is exhaustive or illustrative. Those favouring the former interpretation argue that RTA parties should not apply safeguards against each other, while those favouring the latter interpretation argue that safeguard measures should be applied on an MFN basis.
• How does one resolve the problem that notifications under Article XXIV are intended to allow other Members to comment prior to implementation, but in practice are often made on a post hoc basis after ratification by national legislatures?
• Is there any substantive difference between interim agreements, which are also agreements per se, and agreements with transition periods?
One issue which has not been discussed extensively in the systemic debate, except in relation to the notification requirements, is that of RTAs established under the Enabling Clause, i.e., RTAs in the area of trade in goods between developing countries. Such agreements may take the form of mutual reduction or elimination of tariffs on traded products. As Laird (1999) Zealand and South Pacific countries), and others. As noted by Laird (1999) , the developed countries tend to have wider trade coverage and generally apply their commitments over a stricter time-frame than their partners. There is no explicit provision for such asymmetrical application of the WTO rules, although this would seem consistent with the principle of special and differential treatment for developing countries.
A few Members have expressed their willingness to renegotiate the rules relating to RTAs in an effort to strengthen them. Others have endorsed this approach on condition that
RTAs already notified to the WTO remain subject to the conformity conditions that prevailed at that time; thus, an attempt to "grandfather" existing RTAs. Others have emphasized the need to ensure that agreements contribute to economic development.
VI CONCLUSIONS
Does membership of an RTA weaken the interest in multilateral negotiations and liberalization? The background of unilateral reforms and increased membership of the strengthened multilateral system should mean that the recent strong trend towards regionalism is somewhat less dangerous to third countries and to the multilateral system than earlier experiences. This conclusion is re-inforced by the nature of the new agreements, which have wider coverage of product and instruments than earlier agreements, enhancing the degree of integration. On the other hand, we have certainly heard in Geneva comments from negotiators to the effect "If we do not get what we want in the negotiating agenda, why should we worry? We have our own RTA. That is where the action is!" Was this a factor behind the failure of the WTO Ministerial meeting in Seattle in late 1999? On the whole, experience seems to confirm the equivocal view of Winters (1998) who says that there is no reason to expect a simple answer to whether regionalism encourages or discourages the evolution towards globally freer trade.
Similarly, the jury remains out on whether the emerging mega-blocs of RTAs will facilitate or frustrate the making of multilateral agreements. It should be noted, however, that the emerging mega-blocks ignore, for the most part, the least-developed countries, particularly those in sub-Sahara Africa and South Asia. WTO (1995) suggests the conversion of the examination process towards a transparency mechanism, which could be welfare-enhancing as suggested by the public choice literature. For example, the present legal examinations might be completed, reflecting the existing divergences of opinion (the current approach in the CRTA), and this might be followed with a periodic examination, looking at the implementation of each agreement and the evolution of trade among partners. A timetable for broad-based, economic review, keeping the RTAs under scrutiny, could go some way to satisfying the concern of third countries about the operation of RTAs.
There can be little doubt that the main economic advantages to participants in regional trade agreements would be even greater if the liberalization were carried out on a wider, multilateral scale. RTAs are a second-best solution. Thus, on the basis of theory, Kemp and Wan (1976) note "...there is a big incentive to form and enlarge a customs union until the world is one big customs union, that is, until free trade prevails." 
